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Abstract. The secure hash function SHA-256 is a function on bit
strings. This means that its restriction to the bit strings of any given
length can be computed by a finite instruction sequence that contains
only instructions to set and get the content of Boolean registers, for-
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instruction sequences for the restrictions to bit strings of the different
possible lengths by means of uniform terms from an algebraic theory.
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1 Introduction
SHA-256 is one of the hash functions defined in the Secure Hash Standard of
the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology [19]. To phrase it more
precisely, the standard describes an algorithm that computes the hash function
SHA-256 by means of pseudo-code. In this paper, unlike the standard, an al-
gorithm that computes a function is distinguished from the computed function.
SHA-256 is called a secure hash function because it is a hash function for which
it is expected to be computationally infeasible to find an input with a given hash
value and to find two different inputs with the same hash value. SHA-256 is im-
plemented in some widely used security applications and protocols, including
Bitcoin [14], S/MIME [16], TLS [6], SSH [18], and IPsec [9].
To our knowledge, the starting point of studies of the security of SHA-256
keeps being the above-mentioned pseudo-code description of an algorithm that
computes it (see e.g. [8,10,11,12,15,17]). SHA-256 restricted to the bit strings
of a given length can be computed by a finite single-pass instruction sequence
that contains only instructions to set and get the content of Boolean registers,
forward jump instructions, and a termination instruction (see [3]). In this paper,
we describe such instruction sequences for the restrictions to bit strings of the
different possible lengths by means of uniform terms from an algebraic theory
of single-pass instruction sequences. Thus, we provide a mathematically precise
alternative to the pseudo-code description from the standard.
In computer science, the meaning of programs usually plays a prominent part
in the explanation of many issues concerning programs. Moreover, what is taken
for the meaning of programs is mathematical by nature. Yet, it is customary
that practitioners do not fall back on the mathematical meaning of programs
in case explanation of issues concerning programs is needed. They phrase their
explanations from an empirical perspective. An attempt to approach the seman-
tics of programming languages from the emperical perspective that a program
is in essence an instruction sequence is made in [1]. The groundwork for the
approach is an algebraic theory of single-pass instruction sequences, called pro-
gram algebra, and an algebraic theory of mathematical objects that represent
the behaviours produced by instruction sequences under execution, called basic
thread algebra.
The work on an approach to programming language semantics referred to
above initiated a line of research in which issues relating to various subjects
from computer science are rigorously investigated thinking in terms of instruction
sequences. An enumeration of most papers belonging to this line of research is
available at [13]. The work on computational complexity presented in [3,5] and
the work on algorithmic equivalence of programs presented in [4] were prompted
by the fact that, for each function on bit strings, its restriction to bit strings of
any given length can be computed by a finite instruction sequence that contains
only instructions to set and get the content of Boolean registers, forward jump
instructions, and a termination instruction.
This fact also incited us to look for finite instruction sequences containing
only the above-mentioned instructions that compute the restrictions of a well-
known function on bit strings, namely SHA-256, to bit strings of a fixed length.
The general aim of the line of research mentioned above is to bring instruction
sequences as a theme in computer science better into the picture. This is also the
general aim of the work presented in this paper. However, different from usual
in the work referred to above, the accent is this time on a practical problem,
namely the problem to devise instruction sequences that compute the restrictions
of SHA-256 to bit strings of the different possible lengths. As in the work referred
to above, this work is carried out in the setting of program algebra.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we survey program algebra and the
particular fragment and instantiation of it that is used in this paper (Section 2).
Next, we describe how we deal with 32-bit words by means of Boolean registers
(Section 3) and how we compute the basic and derived operations on 32-bit
words that are used in the standard to define SHA-256 (Section 4). Then, we
give the description of instruction sequences that define SHA-256 (Section 5).
Finally, we make some concluding remarks (Section 6).
2 Program Algebra
In this section, we present a brief outline of PGA (ProGram Algebra) and the
particular fragment and instantiation of it that is used in the remainder of this
paper. A mathematically precise treatment can be found in [3].
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The starting-point of PGA is the simple and appealing perception of a se-
quential program as a single-pass instruction sequence, i.e. a finite or infinite
sequence of instructions of which each instruction is executed at most once and
can be dropped after it has been executed or jumped over.
It is assumed that a fixed but arbitrary set A of basic instructions has been
given. The intuition is that the execution of a basic instruction may modify a
state and produces a reply at its completion. The possible replies are 0 and 1.
The actual reply is generally state-dependent. Therefore, successive executions
of the same basic instruction may produce different replies. The set A is the basis
for the set of instructions that may occur in the instruction sequences considered
in PGA. The elements of the latter set are called primitive instructions. There
are five kinds of primitive instructions, which are listed below:
– for each a ∈ A, a plain basic instruction a;
– for each a ∈ A, a positive test instruction +a;
– for each a ∈ A, a negative test instruction −a;
– for each l ∈ N, a forward jump instruction #l;
– a termination instruction !.
We write I for the set of all primitive instructions.
On execution of an instruction sequence, these primitive instructions have
the following effects:
– the effect of a positive test instruction +a is that basic instruction a is
executed and execution proceeds with the next primitive instruction if 1
is produced and otherwise the next primitive instruction is skipped and
execution proceeds with the primitive instruction following the skipped one
— if there is no primitive instruction to proceed with, inaction occurs;
– the effect of a negative test instruction −a is the same as the effect of +a,
but with the role of the value produced reversed;
– the effect of a plain basic instruction a is the same as the effect of +a, but
execution always proceeds as if 1 is produced;
– the effect of a forward jump instruction #l is that execution proceeds with
the lth next primitive instruction of the instruction sequence concerned —
if l equals 0 or there is no primitive instruction to proceed with, inaction
occurs;
– the effect of the termination instruction ! is that execution terminates.
To build terms, PGA has a constant for each primitive instruction and two
operators. These operators are: the binary concatenation operator ; and the
unary repetition operator ω. We use the notation ;ni=0 Pi, where P0, . . . , Pn are
PGA terms, for the PGA term P0 ; . . . ; Pn.
The instruction sequences that concern us in the remainder of this paper
are the finite ones, i.e. the ones that can be denoted by closed PGA terms in
which the repetition operator does not occur. Moreover, the basic instructions
that concern us are instructions to set and get the content of Boolean registers.
More precisely, we take the set
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{in:i.get | i ∈ N+} ∪ {out:i.set:b | i ∈ N+ ∧ b ∈ {0, 1}}
∪ {aux:i.get | i ∈ N+} ∪ {aux:i.set:b | i ∈ N+ ∧ b ∈ {0, 1}}
as the set A of basic instructions.
Each basic instruction consists of two parts separated by a dot. The part on
the left-hand side of the dot plays the role of the name of a Boolean register and
the part on the right-hand side of the dot plays the role of a command to be
carried out on the named Boolean register. For each i ∈ N+:
– in:i serves as the name of the Boolean register that is used as ith input
register in instruction sequences;
– out:i serves as the name of the Boolean register that is used as ith output
register in instruction sequences;
– aux:i serves as the name of the Boolean register that is used as ith auxiliary
register in instruction sequences.
On execution of a basic instruction, the commands have the following effects:
– the effect of get is that nothing changes and the reply is the content of the
named Boolean register;
– the effect of set:0 is that the content of the named Boolean register becomes
0 and the reply is 0;
– the effect of set:1 is that the content of the named Boolean register becomes
1 and the reply is 1.
Let n,m ∈ N, let f : {0, 1}
n
→ {0, 1}
m
, and let X be a finite instruction
sequence that can be denoted by a closed PGA term in the case that A is taken
as specified above. Then X computes f if there exists a k ∈ N such that for all
b1, . . . , bn ∈ {0, 1}: if X is executed in an environment with n input registers,
m output registers, and k auxiliary registers, the content of the input registers
with names in:1, . . . , in:n are b1, . . . , bn when execution starts, and the content of
the output registers with names out:1, . . . , out:m are b′1, . . . , b
′
m when execution
terminates, then f(b1, . . . , bn) = b
′
1, . . . , b
′
m.
3 Dealing with 32-Bit Words
This section is concerned with dealing with bit strings of length 32 by means
of Boolean registers. It contains definitions which facilitate the description of
instruction sequences that define SHA-256 in Section 5. In the sequel, bit strings
of length 32 will mostly be called 32-bit words or shortly words.
Let κ ∈ {in, out, aux}, let i ∈ N+, and let κ:i be the name of a Boolean
register. Then κ and i are called the kind and number of the Boolean register.
Successive Boolean registers are Boolean registers of the same kind with suc-
cessive numbers. Words are stored by means of Boolean registers such that the
successive bits of a stored word are the content of successive Boolean registers
and the first bit of the word is the content of a Boolean register whose number is
in the set {n ∈ N | n mod 32 = 1}. If a word is taken as the binary representation
of a natural number, then the least significant bit is the first bit of the word.
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The words that form a part of the message to which SHA-256 is to be applied
are stored in advance of the computation in input registers, starting with the
input register with number 1, the words that form a part of the message digest
that results from applying SHA-256 are stored during the computation in output
registers, starting with the output register with number 1, and the words that
form a part of intermediate results that arise during the computation, such as
message schedules and hash values are stored in auxiliary registers.
It is convenient to have available the names used in the standard for the
words of the message blocks (M
(i)
j ), the message schedule (Wj), the hash value
(Hj), the working values (a, . . . , h), and the temporary values (T1, T2) in the
current setting for the Boolean registers that contain the first bit of these words.
It is also convenient to have available the names D0, . . . , D7 for the Boolean
registers that contain the first bit of the words of the message digest, the names
t1, . . . , t6, t
′
1, . . . , t
′
4 for the Boolean registers that contain the first bit of the
words of additional intermediate values that are temporarily stored,1 and the
name cb for the Boolean register that contains the carry bit that is repeatedly
stored when computing the addition operation. Therefore, we define:
M
(i)
j , in:k where k = 512 · (i− 1) + 32 · j + 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ 2
55, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15),
Wj , aux:k where k = 32 · j + 1 (0 ≤ j ≤ 63),
Hj , aux:k where k = 32 · j + 2049 (0 ≤ j ≤ 7),
a , aux:2305, b , aux:2337, c , aux:2369, d , aux:2401, e , aux:2433,
f , aux:2465, g , aux:2497, h , aux:2529, T1 , aux:2561, T2 , aux:2593,
t1 , aux:2625, t2 , aux:2657, t3 , aux:2689, t4 , aux:2721, t5 , aux:2753,
t6 , aux:2785, t
′
1 , aux:2817, t
′
2 , aux:2849, t
′
3 , aux:2881, t
′
4 , aux:2913,
cb , aux:2945,
Dj , out:k where k = 32 · j + 1 (0 ≤ j ≤ 7).
It is also convenient to have available the names used in the standard for the
words of the initial hash value:
H
(0)
0 , 01101010000010011110011001100111 ,
H
(0)
1 , 10111011011001111010111010000101 ,
H
(0)
2 , 00111100011011101111001101110010 ,
H
(0)
3 , 10100101010011111111010100111010 ,
H
(0)
4 , 01010001000011100101001001111111 ,
H
(0)
5 , 10011011000001010110100010001100 ,
H
(0)
6 , 00011111100000111101100110101011 ,
H
(0)
7 , 01011011111000001100110100011001 ;
1 The Boolean registers with names t′1, . . . , t
′
4 are reserved for the first bit of interme-
diate values that arise when computing one of the derived operations on bit strings
introduced in Section 4.
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and the names used in the standard for the “SHA-256 constants”:
K0 , 01000010100010100010111110011000 ,
K1 , 01110001001101110100010010010001 ,
...
K63 , 11000110011100010111100011110010 .
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4 Computing Operations on 32-Bit Words
This section is concerned with computing operations on bit strings of length 32.
It contains definitions which facilitate the description of instruction sequences
that define SHA-256 in Section 5.
The basic operations on bit strings that are relevant to SHA-256 are bit-
wise negation, bitwise conjunction, bitwise exclusive disjunction, shift right by
n positions, rotate right by n positions, and addition modulo 32 (0 < n < 32).
For these operations, we define parameterized instruction sequences computing
them in case the parameters are properly instantiated (see below):
NOT(s:k, d:l) ,
;31i=0(+s:k+i.get ; +d:l+i.set:0 ; d:l+i.set:1) ,
AND(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l) ,
;31i=0(−s1:k1+i.get ; #3 ; +s2:k2+i.get ;−d:l+i.set:1 ; d:l+i.set:0) ,
XOR(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l) ,
;31i=0(+s1:k1+i.get ; #4 ; +s2:k2+i.get ; #3 ; #3 ;−s2:k2+i.get;
+d:l+i.set:0 ; d:l+i.set:1) ,
SHRn(s:k, d:l) ,
;31−ni=0 (+s:k+n+i.get ;−d:l+i.set:1 ; d:l+i.set:0) ;
;n−1i=0 (d:l+32−n+i.set:0) ,
ROTRn(s:k, d:l) ,
;31−ni=0 (+s:k+n+i.get ;−d:l+i.set:1 ; d:l+i.set:0) ;
;n−1i=0 (+s:k+i.get ;−d:l+32−n+i.set:1 ; d:l+32−n+i.set:0) ,
ADD(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l) ,
cb.set:0 ;
;31i=0(+s1:k1+i.get ; #8 ; +s2:k2+i.get ; #8 ;−cb.get ; #14 ;
d:l+i.set:1 ; cb.set:0 ; #13 ; +s2:k2+i.get ; #4 ; +cb.get ; #7 ; #7 ;
+cb.get ; #5 ; d:l+i.set:0 ; cb.set:1 ; #3 ; +d:l+i.set:0 ; d:l+i.set:1) ,
2 All 64 definitions have been put into an appendix.
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where s, s1, s2 range over {in, aux}, d ranges over {aux, out}, and k, k1, k2, l range
over {n ∈ N | n mod 32 = 1}. For each of these parameterized instruction se-
quences, all but the last parameter correspond to the operands of the operation
concerned and the last parameter corresponds to the result of the operation
concerned. Except for ROTRn, these parameterized instruction sequences com-
pute the intended operations for all instantiations of their parameters. ROTRn
computes the intended operation provided that the instantiation of the first pa-
rameter differs from the instantiation of the last parameter. In this paper, this
condition will always be satisfied.
Proposition 1. Let n ∈ N be such that 0 < n < 32. Then the function on bit
strings of length 32 computed by
1. NOT (in:1, out:1) ; ! is bitwise negation;
2. AND(in:1, in:33, out:1) ; ! is bitwise conjunction;
3. XOR(in:1, in:33, out:1) ; ! is bitwise exclusive disjunction;
4. SHRn(in:1, out:1) ; ! is shift right by n positions;
5. ROTRn(in:1, out:1) ; ! is rotate right by n positions;
6. ADD(in:1, in:33, out:1);! models addition modulo 232 on natural numbers less
than 232 with respect to their binary representation by 32-bit words.
Proof. Except for the last property, these properties are easy to prove by taking
an arbitrary word position j (0 ≤ j ≤ 31), making a case distinction on the
contents of the input registers containing the bits of the operands at position j,
and using universal generalization. In the case of the fourth and fifth property,
a distinction between the cases j ≤ 31 − n and j > 31 − n is needed too. The
last property is an instance of a more general property proved in [2]. ⊓⊔
In the standard, for SHA-256, six derived operations on bit strings are defined
in terms of the above-mentioned basic operations.3 For these operations, we also
define parameterized instruction sequences computing them:
CH (s1:k1, s2:k2, s3:k3, d:l) ,
NOT (s1:k1, t
′
1) ;AND(s1:k1, s2:k2, t
′
2) ;AND(t
′
1, s3:k3, t
′
3) ;
XOR(t′2, t
′
3, d:l) ,
MAJ (s1:k1, s2:k2, s3:k3, d:l) ,
AND(s1:k1, s2:k2, t
′
1) ;AND(s1:k1, s3:k3, t
′
2) ; AND(s2:k2, s3:k3, t
′
3) ;
XOR(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
4) ;XOR(t
′
3, t
′
4, d:l) ,
Σ0(s:k, d:l) ,
ROTR2(s:k, t′1) ;ROTR
13(s:k, t′2) ;ROTR
22(s:k, t′3) ;
XOR(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
4) ;XOR(t
′
3, t
′
4, d:l) ,
3 In the standard, basic operations and derived operations are called operations and
functions, respectively.
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Σ1(s:k, d:l) ,
ROTR6(s:k, t′1) ; ROTR
11(s:k, t′2) ; ROTR
25(s:k, t′3) ;
XOR(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
4) ; XOR(t
′
3, t
′
4, d:l) ,
σ0(s:k, d:l) ,
ROTR7(s:k, t′1) ; ROTR
18(s:k, t′2) ; SHR
3(s:k, t′3) ;
XOR(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
4) ; XOR(t
′
3, t
′
4, d:l) ,
σ1(s:k, d:l) ,
ROTR17(s:k, t′1) ; ROTR
19(s:k, t′2) ; SHR
10(s:k, t′3) ;
XOR(t′1, t
′
2, t
′
4) ; XOR(t
′
3, t
′
4, d:l) ,
where s, s1, s2, s3 range over {in, aux}, d ranges over {aux, out}, k, k1, k2, k3, l
range over {n ∈ N | n mod 32 = 1}.
Proposition 2. Let n ∈ N be such that 0 < n < 32. Then the func-
tions on bit strings of length 32 computed by the instruction sequences
CH (in:1, in:33, in:65, out:1) ; !, MAJ (in:1, in:33, in:65, out:1) ; !, Σ0(in:1, out:1) ; !,
Σ1(in:1, out:1) ; !, σ0(in:1, out:1) ; !, and σ1(in:1, out:1) ; ! are the functions with
the same names defined in [19].
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the definitions of the
functions concerned in [19]. ⊓⊔
Furthermore, SHA-256 also involves storing 32-bit words and transferring
stored 32-bit words. Therefore, we define the following parameterized instruction
sequences:
SET (b0 . . . b31, d:l) , ;31i=0(d:l+i.set:b31−i) ,
MOV (s:k, d:l) , ;31i=0(+s:k+i.get ;−d:l+i.set:1 ; d:l+i.set:0) ,
where b0, . . . , b31 range over {0, 1}, s ranges over {in, aux}, d ranges over
{aux, out}, and k, l range over {n ∈ N | n mod 32 = 1}.
Proposition 3. The function on bit strings of length 32 computed by
1. SET (b0 . . . b31, out:1) ; ! is the bit string constant b0 . . . b31;
2. MOV (in:1, out:1) ; ! is the identity function on bit strings of length 32.
Proof. These properties are easy to prove by taking an arbitrary word position j
(0 ≤ j ≤ 31), making a case distinction on bj and the content of the input register
containing the bit of the operand at position j, respectively, and using universal
generalization. ⊓⊔
The calculation of the lengths of the parameterized instruction sequences
defined above is a matter of simple additions, subtractions, and multiplications.
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The lengths of the instruction sequences corresponding to the basic operations
on bit strings relevant to SHA-256 are as follows:
len(NOT (s:k, d:l)) = 96 ,
len(AND(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l)) = 160 ,
len(XOR(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l)) = 256 ,
len(SHRn(s:k, d:l)) = 96− 2 · n ,
len(ROTRn(s:k, d:l)) = 96 ,
len(ADD(s1:k1, s2:k2, d:l)) = 673 ;
the lengths of the instruction sequences corresponding to the derived operations
on bit strings defined in the standard are as follows:
len(CH (s1:k1, s2:k2, s3:k3, d:l)) = 672 ,
len(MAJ (s1:k1, s2:k2, s3:k3, d:l)) = 992 ,
len(Σ0(s:k, d:l)) = 800 ,
len(Σ1(s:k, d:l)) = 800 ,
len(σ0(s:k, d:l)) = 794 ,
len(σ1(s:k, d:l)) = 780 ;
and the lengths of the SET and MOV instruction sequences are as follows:
len(SET (b0 . . . b31, d:l)) = 32 ,
len(MOV (s:k, d:l)) = 96 .
In the description of instruction sequences that define SHA-256 in Section 5,
we will also use the abbreviation
CONC FOR i = l TO l′ : {Pi} for Pl ; . . . ; Pl′ ,
where l, l′ ∈ N are such that l < l′, and Pl, . . . , Pl′ are instruction sequences.
We write CONC FOR instead of FOR to emphasize that we have to do here with
an abbreviation for the concatenation of two or more instruction sequences.
5 SHA-256 Hash Computation
In this section, we give the description of instruction sequences that define SHA-
256 using the definitions given in Sections 3 and 4.
The padding of messages to a bit length that is a multiple of 512 is left
out. It is assumed that messages are already padded. Thus, the bit length of
a message is always a multiple of 512. Suppose that N is the bit length of a
message divided by 512. Because the maximum bit length of a message is 264,
we have that 1 ≤ N ≤ 255.
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We write MN , where 1 ≤ N ≤ 2
55, for {0, 1}512·N , and we write M for⋃{
MN | 1 ≤ N ≤ 2
55
}
. Moreover, we write D for {0, 1}
256
. SHA-256 is a func-
tion from M to D. We write SHA-256N for the restriction of SHA-256 to MN .
Clearly, SHA-256 is the unique function from M to D such that, for each N
with 1 ≤ N ≤ 255, for each w ∈MN , SHA-256(w) = SHA-256N (w).
In Table 1, an instruction sequence ISSHA-256N is uniformly described for all
N with 1 ≤ N ≤ 255.
Claim. For each N with 1 ≤ N ≤ 255, the instruction sequence ISSHA-256N
computes the function SHA-256N .
In the standard, the function SHA-256 is defined indirectly and informally by
means of a pseudo-code description of an algorithm that computes it. Therefore,
we cannot formally prove this claim. However, we follow the description of the
algorithm in the standard so precisely in the description of ISSHA-256N that, given
Propositions 1, 2, and 3, the claim is unlikely to be wrong unless the pseudo code
should not be interpreted as to be expected.
An easy calculation leads to the following result.
Proposition 4. For each N with 1 ≤ N ≤ 255, the length of the instruction
sequence ISSHA-256N is 729464 ·N + 1025.
Proof. The calculation is a matter of simple additions and multiplications, using
the lengths of the parameterized instruction sequences given in Section 4:
8 · 32 +
N · (16 · 96 +
48 · (780 + 794 + 3 · 673) +
8 · 96 +
64 · (800 + 672 + 32 + 4 · 673 +
800 + 992 + 673 +
3 · 96 + 673 + 3 · 96 + 673) +
8 · 673) +
8 · 96 +
1
=
729464 ·N + 1025 .
The left-hand side of this equation is laid out in such a way that the structure
of the description in Table 1 is clearly reflected. ⊓⊔
Recall that the instruction sequence ISSHA-256N (1 ≤ N ≤ 2
55) contains
only instructions to set and get the content of Boolean registers, forward jump
instructions, and a termination instruction. Results from [3] suggest that, in
the case of instruction sequences of this kind, instruction sequence size and
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Table 1. The instruction sequence ISSHA-256N
CONC FOR j = 0 TO 7 :
{
SET (H
(0)
i , Hi)
} ;
CONC FOR i = 1 TO N :
{
CONC FOR j = 0 TO 15 :
{
MOV (M
(i)
j ,Wj)
} ;
CONC FOR j = 16 TO 63 :
{
σ1(Wj−2, t1) ; σ0(Wj−15, t2) ;
ADD(t1,Wj−7, t3) ;ADD(t2,Wj−16, t4) ;ADD(t3, t4,Wj)
} ;
MOV (H0, a) ;MOV (H1, b) ;MOV (H2, c) ;MOV (H3, d) ;
MOV (H4, e) ;MOV (H5, f) ;MOV (H6, g) ;MOV (H7, h) ;
CONC FOR j = 0 TO 63 :
{
Σ1(e, t1) ; CH (e, f, g, t2) ; SET (Kj , t3) ;
ADD(t1, h, t4) ; ADD(t2, t3, t5) ;ADD(t5,Wj , t6) ; ADD(t4, t6, T1) ;
Σ0(a, t1) ;MAJ (a, b, c, t2) ; ADD(t1, t2, T2) ;
MOV (g, h) ;MOV (f, g) ;MOV (e, f) ;ADD(d, T1, e) ;
MOV (c, d) ;MOV (b, c) ;MOV (a, b) ;ADD(T1, T2, a)
} ;
ADD(a,H0, H0) ;ADD(b,H1, H1) ; ADD(c,H2, H2) ;ADD(d,H3, H3);
ADD(e,H4, H4) ; ADD(f,H5, H5) ; ADD(g,H6, H6) ; ADD(h,H7, H7)
} ;
CONC FOR j = 0 TO 7 :
{
MOV (Hj , Dj)
} ;
!
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computation time are polynomially related complexity measures. Notice that,
if the message has the maximum bit length (±1.8 · 1019), the length of the
instruction sequence is ±2.6 · 1022.
The maximum number of input registers needed is 264 and the number of
output registers needed is 256. The number of auxiliary registers used is 2945.
We expect that the number of auxiliary registers that are used by an instruction
sequence and computation space are related complexity measures. Notice that
the number of auxiliary registers used does not depend on the length of the
message.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have described instruction sequences that compute the restrictions of the
secure hash function SHA-256 to the bit strings of the different possible lengths
by means of uniform terms from the algebraic theory of single-pass instruction
sequences known as PGA. Thus, we have provided a mathematically precise
alternative to the pseudo-code description of an algorithm that computes SHA-
256 found in the standard.
In previous work belonging to the line of research initiated by the work
presented in [1], the work almost always concerns rigorous investigation of theo-
retical issues thinking in terms of instruction sequences (see [13]). This may give
the impression that PGA is only suitable for work of that kind. The use of PGA
in the work presented in this paper shows that it is more versatile. However,
this work has also shown that scalability calls for extension of PGA to an in-
struction sequence calculus that includes among other things a variable binding
generalized concatenation operator and a suitable definition mechanism.
Results from [3] suggest that, in the case of instruction sequences of the kind
that we have dealt with in this paper, instruction sequence size and computation
time are polynomially related complexity measures. An option for future work
is investigating the possible role of this complexity measure in issues concerning
the complexity of the different kinds of attack on secure hash functions like
SHA-256.
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A Definitions of the SHA-256 constants
K0 , 01000010100010100010111110011000 ,
K1 , 01110001001101110100010010010001 ,
K2 , 10110101110000001111101111001111 ,
K3 , 11101001101101011101101110100101 ,
K4 , 00111001010101101100001001011011 ,
K5 , 01011001111100010001000111110001 ,
K6 , 10010010001111111000001010100100 ,
K7 , 10101011000111000101111011010101 ,
K8 , 11011000000001111010101010011000 ,
K9 , 00010010100000110101101100000001 ,
K10 , 00100100001100011000010110111110 ,
K11 , 01010101000011000111110111000011 ,
K12 , 01110010101111100101110101110100 ,
K13 , 10000000110111101011000111111110 ,
K14 , 10011011110111000000011010100111 ,
K15 , 11000001100110111111000101110100 ,
K16 , 11100100100110110110100111000001 ,
K17 , 11101111101111100100011110000110 ,
K18 , 00001111110000011001110111000110 ,
K19 , 00100100000011001010000111001100 ,
K20 , 00101101111010010010110001101111 ,
K21 , 01001010011101001000010010101010 ,
K22 , 01011100101100001010100111011100 ,
K23 , 01110110111110011000100011011010 ,
K24 , 10011000001111100101000101010010 ,
K25 , 10101000001100011100011001101101 ,
K26 , 10110000000000110010011111001000 ,
K27 , 10111111010110010111111111000111 ,
K28 , 11000110111000000000101111110011 ,
K29 , 11010101101001111001000101000111 ,
K30 , 00000110110010100110001101010001 ,
K31 , 00010100001010010010100101100111 ,
K32 , 00100111101101110000101010000101 ,
K33 , 00101110000110110010000100111000 ,
K34 , 01001101001011000110110111111100 ,
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K35 , 01010011001110000000110100010011 ,
K36 , 01100101000010100111001101010100 ,
K37 , 01110110011010100000101010111011 ,
K38 , 10000001110000101100100100101110 ,
K39 , 10010010011100100010110010000101 ,
K40 , 10100010101111111110100010100001 ,
K41 , 10101000000110100110011001001011 ,
K42 , 11000010010010111000101101110000 ,
K43 , 11000111011011000101000110100011 ,
K44 , 11010001100100101110100000011001 ,
K45 , 11010110100110010000011000100100 ,
K46 , 11110100000011100011010110000101 ,
K47 , 00010000011010101010000001110000 ,
K48 , 00011001101001001100000100010110 ,
K49 , 00011110001101110110110000001000 ,
K50 , 00100111010010000111011101001100 ,
K51 , 00110100101100001011110010110101 ,
K52 , 00111001000111000000110010110011 ,
K53 , 01001110110110001010101001001010 ,
K54 , 01011011100111001100101001001111 ,
K55 , 01101000001011100110111111110011 ,
K56 , 01110100100011111000001011101110 ,
K57 , 01111000101001010110001101101111 ,
K58 , 10000100110010000111100000010100 ,
K59 , 10001100110001110000001000001000 ,
K60 , 10010000101111101111111111111010 ,
K61 , 10100100010100000110110011101011 ,
K62 , 10111110111110011010001111110111 ,
K63 , 11000110011100010111100011110010 .
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